This is exactly what puzzles me.
Or at least you seem to be talking about what puzzles me. The problem is that when I mention this to others, most missunderstand what I mean by “being aware” or “conscious”, and im not sure its possible to refer to this phenomena in a much better way. But that is exactly the argument i usually make, that an automata could behave exactly like me, following the supposed physical laws, but without being aware, or having any sensation, without seeing the images, hearing the sounds, only processing sensorial data. Processing sensorial data isnt the same as feeling/hearing/seeing it.
i disagree with your assumption that an automata could somehow behave exactly like you
like, that doesn’t make any sense, you can’t know what your actions are without you performing them, we can’t magically step outside of space and time and look at our reality like the pages of a comic book, your actions are per definition unique to your specific configuration of particles. It’s like how two books can be identical but obviously they’re not literally the same book, because they’re in different places in space.
your line of reasoning feels a lot like all of the paradoxes, it’s a neat thing to think about but ultimately there’s the extremely trivial solution of “well that’s not possible so it’s a nonissue”
I believe the academic label for your concern is the mind-body problem, or the hard problem of consciousness which specifically questions the gap in explanation between the physical process and the subjective experience. Going against the grain of the OP picture, this is definitely still firmly within the realms of philosophy, not at all a settled science.
This problem presupposes metaphysical realism, so you have to be a metaphysical realist to take the problem seriously. Metaphysical realism is a particular kind of indirect realism whereby you posit that everything we observe is in some sense not real, sometimes likened to a kind of “illusion” created by the mammalian brain (I’ve also seen people describe it as an “internal simulation”), called “consciousness” or sometimes “subjective experience” with the adjective “subjective” used to make it clear it is being interpreted as something unique to conscious subjects and not ontologically real.
If everything we observe is in some sense not reality, then “true” reality must by definition be independent of what we observe. If this is the case, then it opens up a whole bunch of confusing philosophical problems, as it would logically mean the entire universe is invisible/unobservable/nonexperiential, except in the precise configuration of matter in the human brain which somehow “gives rise to” this property of visibility/observability/experience. It seems difficult to explain this without just presupposing this property arbitrarily attaches itself to brains in a particular configuration, i.e. to treat it as strongly emergent, which is effectively just dualism, indeed the founder of the “hard problem of consciousness” is a self-described dualist.
This philosophical problem does not exist in direct realist schools of philosophy, however, such as Jocelyn Benoist’s contextual realism, Carlo Rovelli’s weak realism, or in Alexander Bogdanov’s empiriomonism. It is solely a philosophical problem for metaphysical realists, because they begin by positing that there exists some fundamental gap between what we observe and “true” reality, then later have to figure out how to mend the gap. Direct realist philosophies never posit this gap in the first place and treat reality as precisely equivalent to what we observe it to be, so it simply does not posit the existence of “consciousness” and it would seem odd in a direct realist standpoint to even call experience “subjective.”
The “hard problem” and the “mind-body problem” are the main reasons I consider myself a direct realist. I find that it is a completely insoluble contradiction at the heart of metaphysical realism, I don’t think it even can be solved because you cannot posit a fundamental gap and then mend the gap later without contradicting yourself. There has to be no gap from the get-go. I see these “problems” as not things to be “solved,” but just a proof-by-contradiction that metaphysical realism is incorrect. All the arguments against direct realism, on the other hand, are very weak and people who espouse them don’t seem to give them much thought.
This is exactly what puzzles me. Or at least you seem to be talking about what puzzles me. The problem is that when I mention this to others, most missunderstand what I mean by “being aware” or “conscious”, and im not sure its possible to refer to this phenomena in a much better way. But that is exactly the argument i usually make, that an automata could behave exactly like me, following the supposed physical laws, but without being aware, or having any sensation, without seeing the images, hearing the sounds, only processing sensorial data. Processing sensorial data isnt the same as feeling/hearing/seeing it.
i disagree with your assumption that an automata could somehow behave exactly like you
like, that doesn’t make any sense, you can’t know what your actions are without you performing them, we can’t magically step outside of space and time and look at our reality like the pages of a comic book, your actions are per definition unique to your specific configuration of particles. It’s like how two books can be identical but obviously they’re not literally the same book, because they’re in different places in space.
your line of reasoning feels a lot like all of the paradoxes, it’s a neat thing to think about but ultimately there’s the extremely trivial solution of “well that’s not possible so it’s a nonissue”
I believe the academic label for your concern is the mind-body problem, or the hard problem of consciousness which specifically questions the gap in explanation between the physical process and the subjective experience. Going against the grain of the OP picture, this is definitely still firmly within the realms of philosophy, not at all a settled science.
This problem presupposes metaphysical realism, so you have to be a metaphysical realist to take the problem seriously. Metaphysical realism is a particular kind of indirect realism whereby you posit that everything we observe is in some sense not real, sometimes likened to a kind of “illusion” created by the mammalian brain (I’ve also seen people describe it as an “internal simulation”), called “consciousness” or sometimes “subjective experience” with the adjective “subjective” used to make it clear it is being interpreted as something unique to conscious subjects and not ontologically real.
If everything we observe is in some sense not reality, then “true” reality must by definition be independent of what we observe. If this is the case, then it opens up a whole bunch of confusing philosophical problems, as it would logically mean the entire universe is invisible/unobservable/nonexperiential, except in the precise configuration of matter in the human brain which somehow “gives rise to” this property of visibility/observability/experience. It seems difficult to explain this without just presupposing this property arbitrarily attaches itself to brains in a particular configuration, i.e. to treat it as strongly emergent, which is effectively just dualism, indeed the founder of the “hard problem of consciousness” is a self-described dualist.
This philosophical problem does not exist in direct realist schools of philosophy, however, such as Jocelyn Benoist’s contextual realism, Carlo Rovelli’s weak realism, or in Alexander Bogdanov’s empiriomonism. It is solely a philosophical problem for metaphysical realists, because they begin by positing that there exists some fundamental gap between what we observe and “true” reality, then later have to figure out how to mend the gap. Direct realist philosophies never posit this gap in the first place and treat reality as precisely equivalent to what we observe it to be, so it simply does not posit the existence of “consciousness” and it would seem odd in a direct realist standpoint to even call experience “subjective.”
The “hard problem” and the “mind-body problem” are the main reasons I consider myself a direct realist. I find that it is a completely insoluble contradiction at the heart of metaphysical realism, I don’t think it even can be solved because you cannot posit a fundamental gap and then mend the gap later without contradicting yourself. There has to be no gap from the get-go. I see these “problems” as not things to be “solved,” but just a proof-by-contradiction that metaphysical realism is incorrect. All the arguments against direct realism, on the other hand, are very weak and people who espouse them don’t seem to give them much thought.