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- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
A Biden administration official says that Ukraine can keep the offensive going for around six to seven weeks more, and there are private disagreements over how much progress can be made in that time.
Given that AFU having abandoned most of their reserves to break through the defence line and suffered heavy losses while trying to break through it, are unlikely to be able to go far.
Meanwhile, according to a senior US intelligence official the quality of Ukrainian forces is declining over time.
Finally, US officials have criticized the Ukrainian military strategy, in particular for the decision to deploy experienced units in the east, near Bakhmut, rather than in a key area in the south.
It looks like AFU is now stretched thin across the line of contact and isn’t able to concentrate sufficient numbers of troops in any one area to make significant progress. Russian offensive in the north means that Ukraine can’t pull troops to the south without sacrificing their positions. However, the west wants to see visible progress and pressuring them to do so.
This reminds me of what happened in Kherson, where Russia fled back over the river. Was it around the end of last year?
It was touted as a huge victory for Ukraine. Maybe it was. It seemed obvious to me that Russia would gain little by trying to keep open a supply line at the time across the river, potentially leaving it’s troops and equipment vulnerable. I know what I’d have done—there’s a point at which you’ve got to cut your losses.
If it was even cutting their losses; if they weren’t too interested with Kherson at the time, it could’ve been a success, by drawing in Ukrainian forces, away from something else they Russia actually wanted at the time.
Same as the land towards Kiev/in the North. All presented as huge losses for Russia. I’m sure there’s war propaganda that slips past me. 100% sure, in fact. But this western reportage about land is all shoddy, transparent propaganda.
I assume it’s intended to maintain public support and to sell papers/air time. It’s easy to forget that what journos push as an exciting narrative (read: trivialising and cynically twisting a tragedy for personal gain) gets eyes on paper/screen—an invitation to sell advertising space to the army surplus and hunting stores for new camos and knives.
Not to mention the dialectic between the public knowing this story because it’s in the movies, and the public afterwards thirsting to buy more cinema tickets to watch movies that help them imagine being the hero in the Ukrainian unit. (And vice versa for Russians and Russian media.)
When we hear about the land is a pompous politician, who’s shit ideas get plastered over every sheet and screen. When it’s news about how much equipment Ukraine is losing, it’s hidden in an article with loads of inflated rhetoric that doesn’t really mean much. We can’t claim they don’t tell us what’s happening but they obfuscate the truth like hiding a single blueberry in a kale and spinach smoothie.
The Kharkiv retreat allowed Russia to hold referenda in the four new oblasts in peace. There had been talks about the referenda to be held in August but it kept getting delayed because of the fear of an imminent Ukrainian counter-offensive. Literally right after the Kharkiv retreat, after the Ukrainian had poured their troops into Kharkiv, the Russians held their referenda. No Ukrainian attacks on those regions. A military defeat, maybe, but a political victory for sure.
There it is, then. I didn’t realise the connection between the retreat and the referenda.
Although I at least knew there were referenda, even now I talk to people who have no idea that those regions held a vote at all. The propaganda worked.