Fight decades of misinformation on China with official Chinese sources.

  • 57 Posts
  • 187 Comments
Joined 3 years ago
Cake day: October 16th, 2021
  • qwename@lemmygrad.mlMtoChina@lemmygrad.ml•How prevalent are racism and chauvinism in China (among Han Chinese)?
    17·
    4 days ago

    There are more than 1.4 billion Chinese people, there are 1.092 billion netizens as of 2023. Weibo (Chinese social media platform similar to X/Twitter) alone has 255 million daily active users and 588 monthly active users, that’s about the same as X/Twitter but the latter has users from all around the world. Once we have that scale in mind, we can discuss the prevalence of specific opinions online. I will keep my discussion to Weibo as I use it more often than other platforms.

    You can see all kinds of opinions on Weibo as long as they do not contain sensitive words, here’s a partial list based on what I’ve seen:

    • countries: pro/anti-(Palestine/Israel/Ukraine/Russia/DPRK/ROK/Japan/Vietnam/Thailand/USA/India)
    • stereotypes and nicknames for certain groups of people: Americans/Anglo-Saxons/Caucasians/Jews/“Blacks” in Guangdong/“Blacks” in general/Indians/people from certain provinces/people of certain ethnic minorities/LGBTQ+
    • government policies: pro/anti-(masks/covid-19 vaccine/peaceful reunification/One Country, Two Systems/anti-hegemony/two or three child policy/delayed retirement/gaokao)
    • ideology: feminism (女权)/faux-feminism (女拳)/male chauvinism (大男子主义、男拳)/Han chauvinism (大汉族主义, 皇汉)/national chauvinism (民族/大国沙文主义)/Mao Zedong Thought/Deng Xiaoping Thought/Xi Jinping Thought
    • conspiracy theories: US manned moon landings in the 1960’s, 9/11 of 2001, covid-19 origins, flat earth theory

    The list goes on and on.

    If you see a certain opinion online very often (subjectively), does that mean that many (remember 1.4 billion) people in real life share that same opinion? More importantly, if some people do indeed share a certain opinion, are they going to act accordingly to that opinion, or is it just something they say now but act differently when the situation arises? I wouldn’t trust any study about the prevalence of any online opinion unless the sample size is at least in the hundreds of thousands to a few million.

    According to patriots today, the online environment for patriots and those who are pro-China and pro-CPC in the early 2000s up until a decade ago was nasty, that tells me that certain “intellectuals” (公知) are very outspoken and anti-China back in the day. Nowadays they keep a lower profile due to the positive change in online environment, but you can still find them around.

    Forgot to explain the “wishing genocide on the people of Taiwan or Japanese people”: The online opinion of Taiwan is that most people there are in favour of “Taiwan independence”, thus the slogan 留岛不留人 (keep the island and not the people, which basically means “genocide”) is popular among some people. I personally hope that peaceful reunification rather than non-peaceful reunification happens, I am also against this particular slogan.

    As for Japan, keep in mind that China sustained at least 35 million casualties due to Japanese invasion, and the Japanese government remains unapologetic to this day. Japan is seen as a lapdog of the US like the ROK. I will not wish “genocide” upon the Japanese people, but if anyone does not understand the rage and hate some of our fellow countrymen have against the Japanese, I will show no respect to that person.

  • qwename@lemmygrad.mltoAsk Lemmygrad@lemmygrad.ml•Can someone be a landlord and a communist at the same time?
    20·
    4 days ago

    The issue here is not that of a single communist being a landlord, but that of the people not all becoming landlords. At the socialist stage, all land belongs to the state and hence the people, thus everyone is a “landlord”.

    Now back to the pre-revolution capitalist society, it is vital that communists control more land and resources, control more means of production, control more media outlets. If something doesn’t belong to a communist, it’s safe to say that it isn’t in the hands of the proletariat either.

    Communists are not capitalist philanthropists, and should not be broke volunteers either. There exists a twisted mindset among some communists that they should be poor or own very little private property while helping the proletariat. Indeed, most of the land and means of production would be seized after the revolution, and many communists would gladly give up their private property at that point, but that doesn’t mean that you should have none before. Communists should control as much as they can before the revolution.

    If you own more than one house, the extra house can be used for the socialist cause, that includes using it as a base of operations, as a home for people in need, or renting it out as a source of income. The question of being a communist landlord arises if you choose to rent your extra houses. (Selling the house is an option if the funds are then used to empower communists like developing the means of production, or if there is an urgent situation that calls for it.)

    There are many scenarios to consider in the case of a communist landlord:

    1. Cheap rent to those that “deserve” it.
    2. Normal rent to anyone.
    3. Expensive rent specifically for high-earning proletariat/petite-bourgeoisie/capitalist.

    (I didn’t include free rent as that does not involve a source of income.)

    In all three scenarios, a communist may indeed feel guilty of robbing or exploiting others, but be aware that we are considering the pre-revolution capitalist society. If you’re just going to pocket the money for yourself, then you wouldn’t be considered a communist in the first place. Organizing requires time and money/capital. Without Engel’s financial aid, Marx wouldn’t be able to continue his research. Without revolutionary base areas and the aid of peasants in the rural areas, and without the spirit of self-reliance, the Chinese Communists lead by Mao Zedong would not have succeeded in their revolution.

    In conclusion, there’s only a problem with being a communist and a landlord if you’re living in a capitalist society and not going to use the rent money for the socialist cause.

  • qwename@lemmygrad.mltoGenZedong@lemmygrad.ml•On Trans rights in China
    20·
    5 days ago

    The Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS) and Transgender Hormone Therapy (THT) articles on Baike wiki includes the current situation in China. From what I’ve read in these two articles, THT is less “standardized” than SRS, and the former cannot be used as a basis to change your legal sex.

    What I mean by “standardized” is that the National Health Commission has published standards for SRS in 2017 and updated them in 2022, the same cannot be said for THT. Here are the criteria in 2017 and 2022 for someone who wants to undergo SRS: (translated with DeepL)

    2017:

    性别重置技术管理规范（2017年版） – 三、技术管理基本要求 – （四）手术前手术对象应当满足以下条件：

    1. 对性别重置的要求至少持续5年以上，且无反复过程。
    2. 术前接受心理、精神治疗1年以上且无效。
    3. 未在婚姻状态。
    4. 年龄大于20岁，具备完全民事行为能力。
    5. 无手术禁忌证。

    Translation: Code of Technical Management for Gender Reset (2017 Edition) - III. Basic Requirements for Technical Management - (d) Pre-surgical surgical candidates should fulfill the following conditions:

    1. The [request/need] for gender reset has lasted for at least 5 years without a recurrent process.
    2. Received psychological and psychiatric treatment for at least 1 year prior to the surgery and is ineffective.
    3. Not in the state of marriage.
    4. Be older than 20 years old and have full capacity for civil behavior.
    5. No contraindications to surgery.

    2022:

    国家限制类技术临床应用管理规范（2022 年版） – G05 性别重置技术临床应用管理规范（2022 年版） – 三、技术管理基本要求 – （四）手术前手术对象应当满足以下条件：

    1. 对性别重置的要求至少持续 5 年以上，且无反复过程。
    2. 未在婚姻状态。
    3. 年龄满 18 岁，具备完全民事行为能力，有能力完成性别重置序列治疗。
    4. 无手术禁忌证。

    Translation: National Code of Practice for Clinical Application of Restricted Technologies (2022 Edition) - G05 Code of Practice for Clinical Application of Gender Reset Technologies (2022 Edition) - III. Basic Requirements for Technical Management - (d) Pre-surgical surgical objects should fulfill the following conditions:

    1. The request for gender reassignment has lasted for at least five years without a recurring process.
    2. Not in the state of marriage.
    3. Have reached the age of 18, have full capacity for civil behavior, and have the ability to complete the gender reassignment sequence treatment.
    4. No contraindications to surgery.

    Note that the updated criteria in 2022 removed the need for previous psychological and psychiatric treatment, and lowered the age requirement from 20 to 18.

    There were two nationwide studies on the transgender community, conducted in 2017 and 2021, and problems with medical support in China was mentioned in the published findings.

    Back to the question about access to estrogen, since there does not seem to be any national standard for THT, and 雌二醇 (Estradiol) is prescription medication, I would guess that it is indeed hard to get estrogen.

    The user also mentioned that this is the only thing stopping them from moving to China, I think they’re underestimating the challenges in emigrating to any foreign country in general, especially a country with a strong national identity like China.

  • qwename@lemmygrad.mlMtoChina@lemmygrad.ml•Did Deng actually say "To be rich is glorious"?
    32·
    17 days ago

    There is a slogan “勤劳致富光荣”, which basically means “prosperity through hard work is glorious”, it can be shortened to “致富光荣” by removing the prefix “勤劳” (hard work), and this can be “mistranslated” into “to get rich is glorious”. I don’t think Deng Xiaoping actually said it, because even the Chinese Wikipedia page only mentions that this slogan was “associated” with him and Reform and Opening Up.

    However, Deng was confronted with this exact phrase in 1986 during an interview with American TV Correspondent Mike Wallace, this is the excerpt from “Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume III” (Foreign Language Press) page 173 to 174: (Theory China ebook link, marxists.org link, Chinese 71.cn link)

    Wallace: To get rich is glorious. That declaration by Chinese leaders to their people surprises many in the capitalist world. What does that have to do with communism?

    Deng: We went through the “cultural revolution”. During the “cultural revolution” there was a view that poor communism was preferable to rich capitalism. After I resumed office in the central leadership in 1974 and 1975, I criticized that view. Because I did so, I was brought down again. Of course, there were other reasons too. I said to them that there was no such thing as poor communism. According to Marxism, communist society is based on material abundance. Only when there is material abundance can the principle of a communist society—that is, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”—be applied. Socialism is the first stage of communism. Of course, it covers a very long historical period. The main task in the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces, keep increasing the material wealth of society, steadily improve the life of the people and create material conditions for the advent of a communist society.

    There can be no communism with pauperism, or socialism with pauperism. So to get rich is no sin. However, what we mean by getting rich is different from what you mean. Wealth in a socialist society belongs to the people. To get rich in a socialist society means prosperity for the entire people. The principles of socialism are: first, development of production and second, common prosperity. We permit some people and some regions to become prosperous first, for the purpose of achieving common prosperity faster. That is why our policy will not lead to polarization, to a situation where the rich get richer while the poor get poorer. To be frank, we shall not permit the emergence of a new bourgeoisie.

    Note that the phrase I highlighted, “to get rich is no sin” (致富不是罪过), is also very controversial when taken out of context like “to get rich is glorious”.

  • qwename@lemmygrad.mlMtoChina@lemmygrad.ml•How democratic are Chinese companies?
    12·
    28 days ago

    Regarding board members, you can look at my comments in a post about the latest revision of the Company Law, but it’s mostly about changes and not a detailed explanation of the Employee’s Congress and other democratic mechanisms: https://lemmygrad.ml/comment/4153037

    There are roughly these categorizations[1][2][3] for enterprises in China, and I’m already confused after researching the differences:

    • domestic-funded enterprise (内资企业)
      • state-owned enterprise (SOE, 全民所有制企业/国有企业)
      • collective enterprise (集体所有制企业)
      • associated enterprise (联营企业)
      • cooperative stock enterprise (股份合作企业)
      • limited liability company (LLC, 有限责任公司)
      • corporation or joint stock limited company (股份有限公司)
      • private enterprise (私营企业)
    • enterprises invested by Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan (港、澳、台商投资企业)
    • foreign-invested enterprise[4] (外商投资企业)

    The type of enterprise is very important as it directly affects who is able to make decisions. As you insist on asking about “Chinese companies in general”, here are some excerpts from an article on a website run by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions[5]: (translated using DeepL with minor corrections)

    From the section on “Difficulties and Problems Facing the Current Democratic Management of Enterprises and Institutions” (当前企事业单位民主管理工作面临的困难和问题):

    • inadequate awareness (思想认识不够到位):

    一些企业经营者把企事业单位民主管理制度与现代企业制度对立起来，把职工代表大会制度与董事会、监事会对立起来，认为公司有了股东会、董事会和监事会就没有必要再召开职工代表大会，要发挥职工代表大会的作用就会制约企业的发展，妨碍企业的经营管理权，影响公司治理结构的有效运行。

    Some enterprise operators put the democratic management system of enterprises and institutions in opposition to the modern enterprise system, and the system of employee’s congresses in opposition to the board of directors and supervisory boards, believing that there is no need to convene employee’s congresses when a company has a shareholders’ meeting, a board of directors and a supervisory board, and that to play the role of employee’s congresses will constrain the development of the enterprise, impede the right to manage the enterprise’s business and affect the effective operation of the corporate governance structure.

    • insufficient standardization of processes (程序运作不够规范):

    一是有的企业多年不开职工代表大会，即使开也不严格遵从法定程序，走走过场，作作样子。有的以其他会议代替职代会，搞“二会合一”“三会合一”甚至“四会合一” 。

    1. Some enterprises do not hold employee’s congresses (EC) for many years, and even when they do, they do not strictly follow the legal procedures, going through the motions and making a show of it. In some cases, other meetings are held in place of the EC, and “two meetings in one”, “three meetings in one” or even “four meetings in one” are organized.

    二是一些企业职工代表大会中半数以上职工代表是各级管理人员，在职工代表的产生上存在“指定代表”和选举程序“走过场”现象，既没有实行差额选举，也没有广泛征求职工意见，产生的职工代表缺乏群众基础，难以充分代表广大职工的意愿。

    1. In some enterprises, more than half of the employee representatives in the employee’s congress are managers at all levels, and there is the phenomenon of “appointed representatives” and “going through the motions” in the election of employee representatives, with neither the implementation of short-listed elections nor extensive consultation with the employees, resulting in a lack of a mass base for employee representatives to adequately represent the will of the general employees.

    三是有些企业在职工代表大会召开之前没有经过征集职工代表议案、审查确定会议议题等规定程序，而是直接到职工代表大会上进行审议，举手表决通过。

    1. Some enterprises do not go through the prescribed procedures of soliciting motions from employee representatives and reviewing and determining the topics for the meeting before the employee’s congress is convened, but instead go directly to the employee’s congress for deliberation and adoption by a show of hands.

    四是有些企业怕得罪领导，直接取消民主评议领导干部、代表大会发言等重要环节，认为年底人事考核可以代替职代会民主评议。

    1. Some enterprises are afraid of offending the leadership, and directly cancel the democratic evaluation of leading personnel, congress speech and other important links, and think that the end-of-year personnel assessment can replace the democratic review by the employee’s congress.
    • inadequate ability (能力素质不够高):

    一是一些企业挑选“老好人代表”“听领导话代表”，职工戏称他们是“握手、举手、拍手”三手代表，是“稻草人”“橡皮人”， 这些人一切看领导眼色行事，往往不能真正代表职工说话，为职工办事。个别企业选举爱与领导作对、像“刺头”那样的代表，这样的代表爱出风头，容易弄僵干群关系，更难为职工办成好事。

    1. Some enterprises select “nice guy” or “yes-man” as (employee) representatives, […] these people act under the preferences of leadership, and often do not really speak on behalf of the employees or do things for them. Some enterprises in particular elect representatives who love to work against the leadership and act like “thorns”, and such representatives love to be in the limelight, this is likely to stiffen relations between the cadres and the masses, making it more difficult to do good things for the employees.

    三是企业工会干部作为企业成员之一，在经济上受制于企业，往往会对推行民主管理制度产生畏难情绪，在为职工维权上存在“不敢维、不会维、不能维”的“三不”现象。

    1. As members of the enterprise trade union, cadres are economically constrained by the enterprise, they are often afraid of implementing the democratic management system, and there exists the phenomenon of “three not’s” of “not daring to defend, not knowing how to defend, not being able to defend” in defending the rights of the employees.

    四是在国有企业改革改制深化过程中，随意撤并工会组织现象突出，且呈蔓延趋势，一些中央企业工会主席被排斥在公司领导层之外，缺少话语权，直接影响到民主管理工作的推进力度。

    1. In the process of deepening the reform and restructuring of state-owned enterprises, the phenomenon of arbitrarily withdrawing and merging trade union organizations is prominent and is spreading, and the chairman of the trade union of some central enterprises is excluded from the leadership of the company and lacks a voice, which has a direct impact on the strength of the promotion of democratic management.

    References

  • qwename@lemmygrad.mlMtoChina@lemmygrad.ml•Western academia discovering that China's politics revolve around ideological struggles
    13·
    1 month ago

    Emphasis on “liberal” in when I say “decent Chinese liberal analysis”, because the author is still using a binary leftist/conservatism against “reformist”/liberal mindset throughout the paper. This same mindset is shared by ultra-lefts, or left-deviationists, so really these are two extremes in ideology.

    In China, reformers include both those who seek to get rid of the Chinese Communist Party and make the country a liberal democracy, as well as those who believe in the necessity of economic marketization, opening up to the outside world, and allowing some limited political reform that falls short of challenging the party’s supremacy. Conservatives oppose a market economy and political liberalization, usually in the name of safeguarding socialist orthodoxy, i.e., an economic system based on public ownership of property or economic assets, class struggle, and the party’s absolute control. In this paper, China’s conservatives are also interchangeably referred to as “leftists,” whereas the reformers are usually regarded as being on the right side of China’s ideological spectrum.

    This binary categorization is why the author concludes that leftists won over reformists and China is now going down the path of “Maoist conservatism”. The author is unable to deal with dialectics as he views the following as policy contradictions:

    First, if Xi was empowered by an elite consensus, what explains the policy contradictions during his early years in power? The party called for deepening marketization while further empowering the state-owned enterprises. It also advocated the rule of law while at the same time emphasizing the party’s unrestrained leadership and tightening up political control. In short, conservative and reformist policies coexisted in a confusing way. Such confusion raises the question of whether there was a unified collective patron who entrusted power to Xi.

    My view is that Deng’s reforms and thus Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is socialist reform at its core, and ideological struggles within the party are not class struggles (socialism vs capitalism), they are instead debates on how to develop socialism. Mao vs Deng is a false antagonism, Mao was never ultra-left, as much as ultras and liberals wished he was. The “complication” with China’s politics as viewed by outsiders arises because they tend to associate certain tools with certain ideologies, like linking markets to capitalism, linking government planning and regulation with socialism. All confusion surrounding China’s politics comes from a lack of dialectical thinking.

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