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The Ground Invasion of Gaza

The United States and Europe have decided to give time for the occupying state to retaliate and regain some of the lost deterrence by giving it a blank check to confront the Resistance. For this purpose, a false propaganda campaign has been launched, including conflating ISIS and the Hamas movement and exaggerating the events that took place in the settlements around Gaza with accusations of rape, beheadings, and the killing of children. These claims will rebound internally when the truth of what happened in the Gaza Strip begins to leak into Zionist society: the decision to kill hostages along with the Resistance, and its decision to expedite the process of controlling the Gaza Strip at the expense of its citizens, as reported by Saleh al-Arouri, a member of Hamas’ political bureau. However, all of the options currently available to the occupying state are difficult.

In essence, it seeks to change the equation imposed by Gaza—to turn [the Resistance’s] initial victory into a defeat. This requires the occupation to neutralize other potential fronts and focus on the Gaza Strip, making the level of pain and destruction sufficient to weaken the Resistance’s power in the sector and force it to yield to aerial, artillery, and naval strikes. All this while planning the possibility of a large-scale ground invasion into Gaza.

However, can the occupying state fulfill its promises to its allies? Can it eliminate the Resistance through a ground or aerial campaign? The main difficulty facing the occupying state is that it may theoretically be able to destroy Gaza, but it will have great difficulty in destroying the Resistance. This equation makes any ground invasion a decisive crossroads in the history of “Israel”even more decisive than the initial Resistance operation—because it also opens itself, with this decision, to the possibility of turning the initial defeat into an even greater defeat if it carries out a ground invasion and, despite inflicting losses on the Resistance, fails to eliminate it.

The occupying state suffers from the tyranny of history; it is used to turning an initial defeat into victory, and it is used to possessing enough power to achieve that. This is what it was able to achieve in the 1973 October War by bypassing the initial Egyptian breach of the Bar Lev Line and turning defeat into victory, forcing Egypt to the Camp David Accords. Faced with the broad alliance that was prepared for war with it before the setback, it was able to launch a preemptive strike using precise intelligence. It effectively neutralized the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces and occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Golan Heights with its ground army.

The tyranny of history causes it [the occupying state] to make incorrect calculations. First, it feels confident in the possibility of defeating the Resistance in Gaza without intervention from other fronts and re-establishing deterrence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Secondly, [it feels confident] that it can carry out a ground offensive and win.

It has four options now:

First, absorb the Resistance’s first strike and, after a harsh air response, create a long-term policy aimed at strangling the sector economically and socially. Second, target the Resistance infrastructure directly, which requires a decisive ground entry with large numbers of troops and exposes it to a new defeat before the world and before its friends and enemies. The third option is to initiate a comprehensive war that strikes multiple fronts and other regional powers in an attempt to demonstrate its strength, which would take the battle to its maximal limits. There is a final option, which is to take the madness as far as possible and render Gaza completely uninhabitable.

All of these options have significant costs.

The risk of entering a ground war is enormous, because the occupation army is not used to ground wars. Despite its claims of being the best urban warfare military force in the world, it will enter under multi-layer air support—small drones, helicopters, suicide drones, and advanced aircraft that continue the bombing process and contribute to linking combat units with multiple layers from air support. The enemy will use chemical weapons in an attempt to destroy the viability of the tunnels. All of this and more.

However, it is important to point out two things: firstly, that the ongoing battle that led to the fall of the Occupation’s Gaza Brigade also means that the Resistance has acquired valuable intelligence about the options available to the entity. This intelligence reinforces what it already has.

Secondly, the resilience of the Resistance after the war will cost the occupying power a great deal politically and psychologically and completely disrupt political opportunities. Relying on its allies at this moment will make it more vulnerable to broader extortion from the Euro-American axis and subsequent concessions after the war.

The army will enter with international logistical support, overwhelming destructive capabilities, armored vehicles of various types, and, perhaps, with the participation of some other countries in the operation. It will have the ability to use poisonous chemical bombs in an attempt to destroy the tunnels and infrastructure of the Resistance.

However, Gaza is seriously prepared to meet the invaders. Perhaps its first strike last Saturday may even be part of a greater deception to drag the occupation to defeat itself.

Conclusion

Although some consider our defeat eternal—and there are those who are in love with defeat itself, and have become a ghost lost in it, while others regret their participation in the first dream based on the hope of liberation—history will prove that the end of the idea of “Israel” began the moment that the downtrodden learned the lessons of the Arab states and those who preceded them in the journey to freedom.

What we see of madness and hysteria in the enemy only confirms the fact that the strong, when exposed as weak, go mad. And the madness here is destruction without a clear political objective."