Rafidhi [her/هي]

  • 49 Posts
  • 96 Comments
Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: July 11th, 2023

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  • “Shahid Bolsen”

    -white man from Rural USA converts to Islam and moves a Muslim diaspora community, marries a Palestinian American.

    -Moves to West Asia and somehow becomes a big media figure in post-color revolution Egypt, advocates salafist ideology aligned with Muslim Brotherhood. He may or may not have been affiliated with salafist attacks in Egypt in the 2010’s.

    -Still in the UAE he assassinated a German Bussinessman in a hotel room then gets caught and ends up getting out with the help of “Detained in Dubai” a sketchy group that has accusations of affiliation with al Qaeda

    -Moves to Malaysia do “NGO work” on the “Rohingya Genocide”.

    -Moves to Turkey (I think not sure 🤔) and is self described consultant for NGO PR work.

    -“Muslim geopolitical thinker” youtube famous even though he’s never been in a Hawza and is literally a white american.

    -Spreads anti-Shia and anti-Iran propaganda wherever he can in the Muslim community.

    -what kind of arrogant names himself shahid anyways.



  • I suspect that a sizeable amount of the “Pro-Russian” telegram channels have been hijacked and taken over by Ukrainian propagandists who post basically the same content except every once and awhile they throw in fantastically fake news during high profile moments to agitate people. We saw it during the “Russian Civil War of 2023” and right after October 7th and a few other events where all of a sudden they were repeating basically NATO talking points. Intel Slava Z in particular is one of the sus ones.

    It wouldn’t be unprecedented.

    "In addition to official media outlets, Ukraine’s Information and Psychological Operations Centers rely on several thousand internet resources including information and news sites, social networks, and coordinated social media groups.

    Even before the start of Russia’s military campaign, certain Ukrainian volunteer internet information resources were controlled by IPsO centers. This included the volunteer communities InformNapalm, (informnapalm.org ), Peacemaker (psb4ukr.org ), Information Resistance (sprotyv.info ), as well as commercial sites (seebreeze.org.ua, petrimazepa.com, podvodka.info, metelyk.org, mfaua.org, burkonews.info, euromaidanpress.com , peopleproject.com and others) used for information campaigns and testing “social engineering” technologies. In particular, it was noted that IPsO officers often operated under the guise of “volunteers” and pseudo-bloggers.

    Ukraine uses various tools – including websites, social networks, and bots – to spread disinformation. In April, hackers from RaHDit and other groups revealed Ukrainian Telegram channels presumably supervised by the SBU, which posed as pro-Russian. An entire network of such channels, with an audience of 5-6 million people, was discovered during the investigation. The list includes channels Operation Z, Novorossiya 2.0, and many others."