What does Game Mode do?

We aim to officially release the Fedora Asahi Remix by the end of August 2023.
Very soon after Asahi Linux started (well before our Arch ARM-based release), Neal Gompa joined our IRC channels and we started talking about working towards integrating our work into Fedora… The Fedora Asahi project started in late 2021, and work began in 2022 alongside the Arch ARM release.
Working directly with upstream means not only can we integrate more closely with the core distribution, but we can also get issues in other packages fixed quickly and smoothly. This is particularly important for platforms like desktop ARM64, where we still run into random app and package bugs quite often.

octalfudge@lemmy.world · 1 year ago

I think for some cases the app already in the App Store has ads and other monetisation (e.g. IAP). In these cases the app is modified to remove these and allow you to get the benefits that were behind a paywall in-game

octalfudge@lemmy.world · 1 year ago

Hi! It’s called iCloud Private Relay and it’s detailed here: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1402274867366477831.html

octalfudge@lemmy.world · 1 year ago

Apple’s stated reason for not covering mail, contacts and calendar is “Because of the need to interoperate with the global email, contacts, and calendar systems, iCloud Mail, Contacts, and Calendar aren’t end-to-end encrypted”. I think it’s worth mentioning that critical bit of context. https://support.apple.com/en-sg/guide/security/sec973254c5f/web. Apple does have to balance usability and security, though this might not be as secure / private as you or I would like.

I think it’s a little misleading to say they considered backdooring it. They intended to scan images for CSAM before uploading it to iCloud Photo Library. A lot of speculation was they wanted to E2EE photos but were worried about the reaction from the FBI and other bodies, given the FBI had pressured them on this before, and so settled on this compromise. If they had managed to do this, they wouldn’t be able to access the photos after they had been uploaded, hence, they had to scan them prior to the uploading.

They attempted to do this with a very complex (and honestly still relatively privacy-preserving) way of comparing perceptual hashes, but perhaps they realised (from the feedback accompanying the backlash) this could easily be abused by authoritarian governments, so they abandoned this idea.

I would assume that a company like Apple is getting significant pressure behind back doors, and they cater to an audience that is unforgiving for any slight reduction in performance or ease-of-use, and wants security features that are almost fully transparent to them. Given these constraints, I’m not sure they can improve much faster than what they’ve demonstrated. Smaller, open-source projects probably don’t have these constraints.

octalfudge@lemmy.world · 1 year ago

You’re absolutely right that it’s still an issue to transmit information about the developer certificate. Apple published a response to this, which admittedly is not ideal:

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202491#view:~:text=Privacy protections

We have never combined data from these checks with information about Apple users or their devices. We do not use data from these checks to learn what individual users are launching or running on their devices.

These security checks have never included the user’s Apple ID or the identity of their device. To further protect privacy, we have stopped logging IP addresses associated with Developer ID certificate checks, and we will ensure that any collected IP addresses are removed from logs.

In addition, over the the next year we will introduce several changes to our security checks:

A new encrypted protocol for Developer ID certificate revocation checks

Strong protections against server failure

A new preference for users to opt out of these security protections